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Abstract
The Coase Theorem suggests that the ability of completely in-
formed agents to make transfers should generally avert conflict. This
thesis considers a complete information model of ethnic conflict where
the dominated group consists of heterogeneous agents, but the dom-
inant group can only bargain with the dominated group as a whole.
This broadly captures a political system with race-based parties and
coalitions. Moreover in this thesis the dominant group can make cred-
ible ex-ante transfers to the dominated group outside a standard bar-
gaining framework. Then conditions arise where conflict occurs.
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1 Introduction
Human civilisation, particular in its recent history has been marked by an
extraordinary pace of scientific and social development. So much so that
some commentators have postulated an “end of history1” where the advent
of Western liberal democracy signals the end point of mankind’s ideological
evolution and the final form of human government. However, one of the
most intractable phenomena in the world today is conflict along ethnic lines
as far afield as Central Africa, Sri Lanka, Palestine and the Balkans.
No doubt there are multiple reasons at work in ethnic conflict, but a
common theme attested to is that ethnic conflict is a contest over resources.
This treats ethnic conflict as a variation on a general bargaining game. But
then prima facie conflict should not occur. Conflict is costly and reduces
the aggregate resource. So if agents know the consequence of conflict they
should surely be able to make transfers and settle on an agreement before
hand?
The literature points to information asymmetries as a common source
of inefficiency. If complete information is assumed, it is typically committ-
ment problems in a repeated game context that are cited as the dominant
reasons why an efficient allocation is not attainable. It is possible to ad-hoc
construct examples where inefficient outcomes are obtained. However this
thesis provides an intuition as to a general mechanism that underlies many
1This comes from Francis Fukuyama’s provocatively titled book, The End of History
and the Last Man
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conflicts in the world. Moreover it provides a counter-intuition as to the
effect of transfers.
This thesis assumes complete information and considers an interaction
between a dominant ethnic group A and its rival B. However agents have
heterogeneity in their costs of conflict. Moreover A cannot make separate
offers to the heterogeneous B. I.e. there is bilateral bargaining but one party
has multiple agents. This is a common feature in many contexts around the
world. e.g. ethnic political parties would typically represent both wealthy
and poor. Into this bargaining framework, A can make a unilateral conces-
sion to B which is an ex-ante transfer. This mechanism allows A to ex-ante
influence the profitability of conflict to the different agents in B. This gener-
ates two results. One is efficiency, but with the unilateral concession being a
tool that maximises A’s share of the surplus. The other is conflict where the
unilateral concession improves the profitability of conflict to A by reducing
the incentives of others to fight. Both these results are broadly consistent
with political theories such as “divide and rule.” The thesis also obtains
some interesting statics as to when both results will be obtained.
This is a particularly interesting result for the following reason. Prima-
facie, an extra mechanism of transfer such as the unilateral concession would
appear to be efficiency enhancing. Indeed the literature emphasises the role
of unilateral concessions as a signalling device between asymmetric agents
that can lead to efficient outcomes. In this thesis it can lead to an inefficient
outcome or an efficient allocation that favours the dominant power.
That said, the primary policy imperative that emerges from this thesis is
not to eliminate unilateral concessions. Pivotal to this result is the imperfect
bargaining mechanism where A cannot make separate offers to the high and
low cost B’s. Thus this thesis would suggest that ethnic-based coalitions
are more susceptible to being exploited by opponents who play upon the
economic heterogeneity present within those coalitions. Hence the solution
would be for political representation more along economic interests. This
would avoid divergent economic interests being captured by ethnic-based
parties.
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2 Literature Review
The literature on ethnic conflict spans a range of disciplines and encom-
passes many different paradigms, some of them opposed, as to what mo-
tivates ethnic conflict. Horowitz (1985) classifies the dominant paradigms
of understanding conflict as economic interests, modernisation theory and
cultural pluralism whilst also advocating his own taxonomy of the causes of
conflict. The traditional “economic interests” argument for conflict is that
agents are motivated by increasing their share of finite resources. Therefore,
in an ethnic conflict, ethnicity is merely the marker under which coalitions
form to agitate for greater resources. Ethnicity does not provide the mo-
tivation. Social scientists and anthropologists have long recognised “pork
allocation” as a substantial motivation in conflict. Other explanations of
conflict however are no doubt valid and it is likely that many conflicts in-
volve a range of factors at work.
This thesis emphasises the “economic interests” paradigm of explaining
conflict. Agents are rational and self-interested and choose actions to max-
imise their share of finite resources. In this sense, ethnic conflict is a specific
expression of a general bargaining problem. The most obvious question that
arises is why can’t agents agree on an allocation and avoid conflict? Con-
sider agents contending over a finite pie. Conflict or any exercise of political
power imposes costs that reduce the ex-post size of the pie to be distributed.
Consequently there must be ex-ante divisions of the pie that deliver a greater
slice to the bargainers than from conflict. Goemans (2000) notes,
If both sides knew how the pie would be divided after the war,
both would be better off if they divided accordingly before the
war.
Conflict then is not only inefficient but Pareto-inferior. This was the con-
tention of Coase (1960) in his Theorem that if completely-informed agents
can costlessly bargain, efficiency should be the outcome. Thus within the
game-theoretic bargaining literature, inefficient outcomes are the exception,
rather than the rule. Alternating-offer bargaining over a single divisible ob-
ject often leads to a unique, efficient, subgame perfect equilibrium allocation
in Rubinstein (1982). Why then does inefficiency occur?
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A standard answer is that inefficiency is the result of information asym-
metries. It is important to note that asymmetric information itself does not
always preclude an efficient outcome. The Coase Conjecture (1972) posits
that even with incomplete information the ability to alternate offers quickly
should produce agreements without costly delay. However, there is a vast
body of work that shows how in many contexts information asymmetry is
the source of inefficient equilibria. However, there are circumstances where
asymmetric information is too broad an assumption. Fearon (2004) identi-
fies protracted stalemate wars e.g. Sri Lanka, as a situation where over the
years fighters know the capacity and resolve of their opponents. This poses
the question of whether there are theoretical explanations of conflict within
a complete information framework.
Some complete-information models of conflict deliver inefficient equilib-
ria but can be shown to be dominated by Pareto-improving efficient equlib-
ria. One case is infinitely repeated games. Inefficient equilibria exist but
with sufficient patience on the part of players, those equilibria are Pareto
dominated by efficient outcomes. Infinitely repeated games frequently sup-
port inefficient outcomes because of the “equilibrium switching” method
that is used to establish Folk Theorems, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
However ethnic conflicts are not typically infinitely repeated games. Once
the offer is accepted the game ends. Pareto domination of inefficient equi-
libria by efficient outcomes occurs in wage-bargaining models where parties
impose costs on each other between offers as in Busch and Wen (1995) and
Muthoo (1999). Models of strikes which are a narrower class of the above
case as in Fernandez and Glazer (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990) deliver
similar results. Also games where the players have the option of reneging
and retracting on previously accepted offers have inefficient equilibria that
are Pareto dominated by efficiency e.g. Muthoo (1999). Slantchev (2003)
constructs a complete information model of war where outcomes are en-
dogenously determined by previous behaviour as opposed to a lottery over
exogenously fixed outcomes. His model supports an inefficient equilibrium
but it is not the only one.
However the literature also points to situations where conflict will be the
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unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). One class of explanation points
to commitment problems that arise in a repeated stochastic game, even if
the bargainers have complete information. An efficient allocation exists,
but the bargainers cannot credibly commit to it. More specifically, to avert
conflict, one party has to buy off another by making a transfer. Resource
constraints typically mean that the transfer must take place over multiple
periods. However, over multiple periods, the transferring party can reach
a level of strength such that it is profitable to renege. Bargaining there-
fore breaks down. A lot of the literature constructs specific scenarios where
the above commitment problem occurs. In Acemoglu and Robinson (2000,
2001) incumbent governments cannot commit to future redistribution. In
Fearon (1998, 2004) the central government cannot commit to future power
sharing. In Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989),
political parties cannot commit to future spending levels. This is similar
to Besley and Coate (1998) where the incumbent government’s decisions
influence the identity or preferences of future governments. This too leads
to inefficiency. Political parties in de Figueiredo (2002) impose inefficient
administrative procedures to protect their programs because future govern-
ments cannot commit to not overturning them. Moreover Fearon (1995)
and Powell (1999) show that in addition to commitment problems, a rapidly
shifting distribution of military power can lead to war. The above exam-
ples are all specific models that harp on a common theme. But Powell
(2004) derives a general inefficiency condition that is common to the above
models and defines when conflict will occur in a repeated stochastic game.
Large, rapid changes in the parties’ relative power cause inefficiency. Specif-
ically, the equilibria must be inefficient even with complete information if
at some time along any efficient path, the expected per-period shift in at
least one of the parties’ minmax payoffs is larger than the bargaining sur-
plus. Powell (2004) identifies the drivers of this condition as follows. Firstly,
parties cannot commit to future allocation decisions and secondly, the pay-
offs that parties can secure through the inefficient use of power varies over
time. Combined with resource constraints, this creates a quickly changing
strategic environment where every efficient path is dynamically inconsistent.
These results also highlight the relevance of political structures and consti-
tutional mechanisms to limit commitment problems.
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Notwithstanding the ability to articulate general conditions as in Powell
(2004), the above examples highlight that within a complete information en-
vironment, the prospect of inefficiency is highly conditional on the specifics
of the game form being considered. Even the condition in Powell (2004)
is a general condition for a specific type of game. Hence the literature is
primarily engaged in constructing bargaining situations where inefficiency is
possible. The most interesting cases are bargaining mechanisms that osten-
sibly would appear to assist the achievement of efficient outcomes yet can
be shown to deliver the opposite. Weinberger (2000) outlines a model with
a “selective acceptance” rule on the outcome of two-issue negotiations. The
model is an alternating-offer game that allows for settlement on one issue
while negotiation continues on the other. Ostensibly such flexibility would
appear to be efficiency enhancing. However the result presented is that if
one issue is indivisible there are inefficient subgame perfect equilibria with
no Pareto-improving alternatives. Furthermore if parties have opposing val-
uations, rapid communication guarantees inefficiency.
In this thesis, which is a single period complete information game, an
agent of inefficiency is a mechanism termed the “unilateral concession.” The
model consists of two ethnic groups A and B. Ethnic group A is assumed
to have political power which allows them to control society’s common re-
source. The unilateral concession is an irrevocable ex-ante transfer made
by group A to group B before bargaining commences. This determines the
size of the pie in the bargaining game. Group A then makes a standard
offer to group B. Group B can accept or reject the offer. If they accept
the game ends. If they reject it the game goes to conflict, where Group B
chooses whether to fight or be passive (not fight). The unilateral concession
takes on significance when one considers that group B consists of two types
of agents, those with a high cost and those with a low cost of conflict. The
conflict subgame where the fight/passive decision is made is a simultaneous
game between the high and low cost group B. In that subgame, the uni-
lateral concession determines the profitability of conflict to the two groups
of B. The interesting result is that it is often in the interest of A to offer
a unilateral concession that makes conflict unprofitable to the high cost B,
effectively “buying them off.” Any conflict that then occurs will only be
“partial” i.e. only the low cost B will fight.
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This thesis gives two main results. The main result is that in a certain
class of games, conditions arise where inefficiency occurs. Under those con-
ditions the unique SPE is for group A to offer a unilateral concession and
then not make an offer to appease those of group B that fight. It is optimal
for group A to engage in partial conflict. The second result is that in another
class of games, efficiency is always the outcome. But the optimal solution for
A is to make a unilateral concession to buy off one subgroup from fighting
and make an offer that appeases the fighting group. So in the presence of
heterogeneity, the unilateral concession either leads to inefficiency or skews
the chosen efficient outcome in the dominant group’s favour. There is a
bargaining imperfection that drives both results. The unilateral concession
derives its potency from the fact that group A cannot negotiate with the
high and low cost group B separately. The unilateral concession is given to
all of group B and most importantly, the same offer is made to all of B.
Thus even though the payoff to the two groups of B may be different in the
conflict subgame, to avoid conflict, A must offer a contract to all of group
B equivalent to the highest attainable payoff in conflict. It is a case of bi-
lateral bargaining but where one party, in this case, group B, has two agents.
The distinction between the class of games where the unilateral conces-
sion induces inefficiency and that where it induces group A-optimal efficiency
is the ability of the subgroup of B that fights to exclude the non participat-
ing members. That is if exclusion occurs, the expected gain from conflict
to the B that fight is high. But group A must make an equivalent value
offer to all group B. Then it is possible that the expected gain to group B
from conflict exceeds the expected loss of group A. Hence no transfer can
avoid conflict. This thesis then effectively models an imperfection in mul-
tiple agent bargaining, with the unilateral concession being the mechanism
that exploits this mechanism. However, just like the selective acceptance
rule in Weinberger (2000), the unilateral concession would prima facie ap-
pear to be efficiency enhancing. Another instrument of making a payment
to B, even if it allows for buying off B or “divide and rule” strategies would
intuitively seem to be positive for efficiency.
The literature on unilateral concessions often emphasises its positive and
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efficiency enhancing effects, particularly in a context of asymmetric informa-
tion. The unilateral concession is thought to stabilise cooperation by making
non cooperative behaviour unprofitable. The unilateral concession operates
as a signalling device between asymmetric parties that enables settlement to
occur e.g. Chatterjee (1996). Hence much of the game theoretic literature
on unilateral concessions is used in an international relations framework,
with negotiations between superpowers or states with asymmetric informa-
tion and divergent goals. Caruso (2007) presents a partial equilibrium model
of conflict where two asymmetric agents contest a stake. Unlike standard
contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to
affect the outcome of the conflict. That involves making a unilateral conces-
sion to invest in peace talks. The result is that under some conditions, an
asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake can lead to a concession from one
agent to the other. Specifically, the agent with a higher valuation makes a
concession, proportional to the optimal choice of “talks.” This can lead to
a Pareto-improving outcome. Larson (1997) and Lepgold and Shamnbaugh
(2001) also present unilateral concessions as a valid tool of bargaining in an
international relations context. The unilateral concession signals one party’s
commitment towards a settlement. Guner (1997) in a case study of water
disputes between Syria and Turkey advocates unilaterally conceding as a
potentially Pareto-improving mechanism in conflict. Senese and Quacken-
bush (2003) in a model of deterrence suggests that unilateral settlements
are more likely to avoid future conflict compared to negotiated settlements.
Whilst asymmetric information is the general environment in which unilat-
eral concessions emerge in the literature, there are also attempts to indicate
what type of governments are likely to offer such concessions. Kriesberg
(1992) argues that authoritarian regimes can more easily make unilateral
concessions than democratic leaders, who are under pressure to show that
they have not “given away the store.” This is used to explain why most
U.S.-Soviet agreement arose not through a tit-for-tat process but from a
pattern of asymmetric concessions by the Soviets.
The contrast with the present thesis is stark. Unilateral concessions in
the above literature can be an optimal decision that induces a Pareto op-
timal peace. Here the unilateral concession directly induces inefficiency. A
crucial difference is that in this thesis, the unilateral concession operates in
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a complete information environment. Hence it is not so much a signal of
good faith as it is a targeted ex-ante attempt by A to control the ensuing
bargaining game. Moreover the above literature typically involves bilateral
negotiations between state actors. Here group A is dealing with two agents
that require different concessions to be appeased. But group A can only
make the same offer for both subgroups of B. It is in this environment
where the unilateral concession then is optimally used to induce conflict as
a “buying off” of one subgroup.
It follows that the other strand of the literature that this thesis builds on
is the area of multiple agent bargaining. With heterogeneous costs, group
A is effectively dealing with two agents for group B. The literature that
analyses one agent bargaining with two parties typically deals with the is-
sue of hold out problems. Cai (2000) expanding on Coase’s farmer railroad
bargaining game shows that it is the presence of multiple farmers whom the
owner has to negotiate with in an endogenous order that causes inefficiency.
A series of inter-dependent hold out problems is created since every farmer
wants to stall the bargaining process in the hope of getting a larger share.
Since a larger group of people finds it easier to stall the process, delay is
shown to increase in the number of bargainers. Other papers study varia-
tions of multiple-person bargaining with a firm. Jun (1987) assumes that
a firm bargains with two unions simultaneously. The firm in Jun’s model
cannot play off one union against the other so there is a unique and effi-
cient equilibrium. In Stole and Zwiebel (1996), the bargaining outcome is
always efficient because the order of reaching agreements with the firm is
fixed among the workers.
Whilst this thesis considers the effects of a dominant group dealing with
two agents, it is quite different from the literature in several key ways. The
above literature looks primarily at the order of bargaining as a means of
determining whether efficiency or inefficiency occurs. Here the fact that
this thesis concerns ethnic conflict and not generic bargaining brings out
a pertinent difference. Holding out is essentially an endogenous means of
increasing one’s payoff. In this thesis group A makes an offer to both sub-
groups of B simultaneously. Rejection of an offer by at least one subgroup
leads to conflict. Moreover conflict in this model is a lottery over exogenous
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outcomes. Therefore, the payoff that each subgroup of B can obtain by
rejecting the offer is fixed and known. There is no prospect of endogenously
increasing the payoff. Holdout and bargaining order then becomes irrele-
vant. What drives inefficiency is a unique bargaining architecture that the
literature has not considered. This architecture is that group A is unable to
make separate offers to each subgroup of B. Unlike the holdout problem,
the efficiency inducing offers that will satisfy each subgroup is known, but
is not implementable. Effectively group A is negotiating with one party but
that party has two agents. In the above literature one bargaining party
equals one agent. Multiple agents is synonymous with multiple parties. So
it is the presence of multiple agents for one party in a bilateral bargaining
mechanism that creates an environment where inefficiency can occur. The
literature has not considered this feature. The prospect of inefficiency can be
intuited from the fact that understanding this thesis in that sense shows why
the Coase Theorem does not hold. A critical assumption in Coase (1960) is
that agents can costlessly bargain. When offering a contract that appeases
the group B subgroup with the highest expected return from conflict, that
same offer has to be a made to the subgroup with a lower expected return
from conflict. That is effectively imposing a cost on bargaining. So bargain-
ing takes place, but it is imperfect.
As aforementioned, this thesis whilst adding to the broad literature on
bargaining is motivated by ethnic conflict. Thus this thesis can be seen as
adding to the literature on ethnic conflict specifically as well. The following
section reviews the literature on ethnic conflict.
The premise of this thesis is that the motivation for ethnic conflict is
control of a finite resource. Whilst economic objectives may be the mo-
tivation, that itself does not explain why ethnic conflict occurs. Consider
that agents are differentiated on the basis of a range of different markers,
ethnicity, wealth etc. And agents can form coalitions on the basis of dif-
ferent markers. Is there a reason ethnic coalitions appear predominant?
Moreover if resource allocation is the motivation behind agents actions it
would be prima facie expected that class based coalitions form. Horowitz
(1985) points out that it is “modest hyperbole to suggest that the Marxian
prophecy has had an ethnic fulfillment.” It is logically consistent to argue
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that even if the motive for conflict is economic, other factors separately de-
termine why coalitions form along ethnic lines. Horowitz (1989) points to
the colonial structures in Sri Lanka and Malaysia to explore why race-based
political parties emerged in the former but not the latter.
However there is a body of literature that shows that if coalition for-
mation is seen as a choice variable, ethnicity is the optimal coalition type.
Esteban and Ray (2008) shows that ethnic conflict is salient because het-
erogeneous wealth levels within ethnic groups create a positive synergy for
conflict. I.e. the poor supply labor, the rich supply resources. On the other
hand class divisions create homogeneous groups. Conflict is clear and well
defined, but hard to conduct for the poor who would lack the resources to
successfully fight. Moreover the rich have a low opportunity cost of resources
but no incentive to initiate a conflict. Furthermore they show it is often the
incentive of the rich to propose an ethnic alliance to prevent a class conflict
initiated by the poor. And it is the incentive of the poor to accept. Kapferer
(1998) rejects the “economic interest” story of conflict and identifies the role
of history and myth. However it is possible then that inflammatory myth
may provide a tool for agents with an economic interest in conflict to get the
masses to follow i.e. affecting mass beliefs in a coordination game. Robin-
son (2001) suggests that the salience of ethnic coalitions can come from the
immutability of race compared with the prospect of mobility with respect to
class. I.e. once the poor become the rich, conflict ends. Esteban and Ray’s
acknowledgment that ethnic coalitions are heterogeneous supports the con-
tention of this thesis that group A and B have heterogeneous costs.
Esteban and Ray (2008) are primarily concerned with the issue of which
coalition is salient. As such they do not propose when conflict will occur
but they suggest that when it occurs it will more likely than not be ethnic
in nature. However their acknowledgment that ethnic coalitions have a het-
erogeneous characteristic implies that those distinctions would play a role in
the outcome of conflict. This thesis takes up where Esteban and Ray (2008)
leaves. This thesis treats the issue of coalition formation as exogenous and
focuses on the outcome of conflict, with particular attention to the role of
heterogeneity. Moreover if “synergy” as Esteban and Ray (2008) term it can
be seen as both subgroups of B fighting together, the unilateral concession
14
in this model becomes a mechanism that group A employs to break down
such synergy.
Caselli and Coleman (2006) does not model coalition formation as a
choice as in Esteban and Ray (2008) but still provides some intuition as to
coalition formation. The coalitions in Caselli and Coleman (2006) are exoge-
nous and ethnic-based. However their model introduces a stage post-conflict
which is “switching”. I.e. the losers can “switch” and pass themselves off
as members of the dominant coalition. This then reduces the ex-post ben-
efit from discrimination. Caselli and Coleman (2006) introduce a notion of
“ethnic distance” that measures the ability of coalitions to withstand ex-
post infiltration. This demonstrates why ethnic coalitions on identities like
race may be stronger than religion. I.e. it is easier to change religion than to
change skin colour. This does not address the issue of why race is preferred
to class. However their model, like this thesis, constructs ethnicity broadly
and includes race, religion, caste etc. Thus individuals can hold multiple
ethnic identities concurrently. So their model provides a reason as to why
some ethnic identities would be a preferred coalition marker to others.
As aforementioned however, the emphasis in this thesis is not so much
on coalition formation which is exogenously set but on the engagement be-
tween parties in a conflict game. Caselli and Coleman (2006) presents a
sequential model where the “dominant” party chooses a Peace (P) stance
which is to share the resource equally or a Conflict (C) stance which is to
appropriate the resource. The weaker party then responds with a Peace or
Conflict move. Conflict occurs if CC is chosen. Then they allow for switch-
ing. In their model, there is no allowance for transfers. Either the dominant
party appropriates completely or they share equally. This thesis is a model
of optimally set transfers which would be a logical mechanism in a conflict
situation. Their model also does not include any heterogeneity within the
ethnic groups. Interestingly it allows for the non-dominant group to exploit
a Peace move by the dominant party and seek to appropriate the resource.
But without a specific context, this seems to be a large assumption.
A body of literature considers conflict where transfers are allowed to
be made. Grossman (1994, 1995) show that redistribution via land reform
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is the optimal response of a landowning class to the threat of extra-legal
appropriation of land rents. In fact Azam (2001), considering the specific
case of Africa argues that violent conflicts must be considered a failure of
the state to perform some of its fundamental tasks. The corollary being
that the increased provision of services by the state e.g. transfers, can avert
conflict. Falkinger (1999) also shows that redistribution can lead to socially
stable outcomes. Gershenson and Grossman (2001) show how the Soviet
elite used cooption of people i.e. giving them a share in the surplus as
a means of control. Azam (1995) analyses the choice of the government
between raising its defence expenditures or giving away some “gifts” to op-
ponents, as a means to defending a position of power. If the government is a
Cournot-Nash player, then there is no gift in equilibrium, and any increase
in the budget will lead to inefficient defence expenditures. However, if the
government is a Stackelberg-leader, then the gift is used as a policy tool for
staying in power. This thesis is different because it examines the role of
unilateral concessions, not just the standard offer. Moreover, the ability to
make the unilateral concession actively leads to a situation of conflict rather
than peace.
The ability to make transfers does not always avoid conflict, as in this
thesis. Within a complete information framework, one reason is commit-
ment problems e.g. Powell (2004) and other repeated stochastic games.
Another reason transfers cannot avert conflict is if the expected gain from
conflict to one party exceeds the expected loss to the other. Effectively
there is a discrepancy in the valuations of conflict. Gershenson and Gross-
man (2000) present a model of civil conflict where the duration of conflict
depends on the value agents ascribe to political dominance. This is a gen-
eral notion and is based on the intuitive idea that a dominant party has the
power to appropriate economic rent, dictate social and religious policy etc.
Different parties may value those powers differently. The value of political
dominance to both parties is exogenously set in Gershenson and Grossman
(2000). Jackson and Morelli (2007) in a model of war, endogenously model
why one party may have a higher valuation of conflict than the other. Jack-
son and Morelli (2007) consider a measure of “political bias” where the bias
stems from the amount of the surplus, the leaders of both parties expect
to expropriate from conflict. If the bias is high then transfers may not be
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able to stop conflict. The ability to expropriate resource is a key driver of
the inefficiency in this thesis. The unilateral concession induces a situation
where only one subgroup of group B fights. Why is an offer unable to settle
the issue? If the subgroup of B that fights can appropriate the resource
all for themselves, they require a high concession to be appeased. But the
bargaining framework requires that same offer to be made to all of group B.
This can exceed the expected loss to group A from conflict.
The reason the unilateral concession in this thesis generates inefficiency
is due to heterogeneous costs among group B. Hence this thesis builds on
the understanding of heterogeneity within ethnic groupings. Esteban and
Ray (2008) identify the synergy of rich and poor as a motivating factor in
conflict. Esteban and Ray (1999) link the level and pattern of social conflict
to the society wide distribution of individual characteristics including race,
wealth etc. They show conflict to be closely connected with the bimodality
of the underlying distribution of characteristics. This thesis not only identi-
fies heterogeneity but shows the unilateral concession as a mechanism that
exploits that heterogeneity towards the interests of A.
There are some other interesting features in the literature on ethnic con-
flict that is not examined by this thesis. Mc Dermott (1997) and Falkinger
(1999) allow for measures of effort and productivity by agents. Then con-
flict and discrimination distorts effort levels. A possible implication is that
a dominant power may want to give productive minorities the resource but
then appropriate the return. Chang (2007) also considers the incentives for
third-party intervention in conflict. Moreover, this thesis exists within a
complete information framework. In Esteban and Ray (2001) conflict arises
from incomplete information. A benevolent planner knows the winning pay-
offs and that the cost of expending resources is identical and isoelastic across
all players. But the planner does not know the value of the elasticity. This
is shown to prevent a Pareto-improving social decision rule, as long as there
are at least four agents.
This thesis also seeks to do some comparative statics on the variables
that relate to conflict. To this end, this thesis is assisted by some empirical
literature and case studies on the causes of ethnic war. Collier and Hoeﬄer
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(2001) show that conflict tends to occur when a dominant group is large and
strong, but not so large that the resource it acquires by discriminating is
negligible relative to the cost of conflict. Miguel et al. (2004) also show that
economic conditions affect the probability of conflict. There is also a vast
body of empirical literature that models the effects of conflict on various
economic outcomes. However that literature is more concerned with the
consequence of conflict whilst this thesis is concerned with the causes. That
said, the economic consequences of conflict no doubt would be relevant to
the incentives of conflict for agents in a complete information model.
3 The Theoretical Model
Consider an economy where agents belong to one of two ethnic groups, A
and B. Ethnicity in this model is a broad term and refers to a variety of
group identities e.g. race, caste, religion, colonial power etc. Without loss
of generality, let group A have mass r and group B have mass 1, where
r > 0. The economy also has a stock of common resources X. Assume
that group A is dominant and controls the resources. Group A can then
restrict the access of group B to X. However agents are heterogeneous in
their costs of conflict. A proportion m of agents are assumed to have a high
cost of conflict c1 and the remainder have a low cost of conflict c2 where
c1 > c2. This distribution is the same within both ethnic groups. So there
are now four subgroups, high cost A, low cost A, high cost B and low cost B.
The game form is the standard used in the bargaining literature. First,
group A makes an offer to group B. The offer is a share, α, of X, where
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. This is the offer stage. However the decision makers of group A
will be acting for the interests of either their high or low cost agents. Group
B then decide whether to accept or reject the offer. This is the response
stage.
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If the offer is accepted, the payoff to an individual member of group A
is
(1− α)X
r
and the payoff to an individual member of group B is
αX
Because group B consists of two types of agents, the response decision
is a simultaneous Nash game played by the high and low cost B. If both
subgroups accept, the game ends. If at least one subgroup of B decides
to reject the offer, the game goes to the second stage which is conflict. In
the conflict stage the offer is removed. There are two outcomes in conflict.
Either A win and retain X or B win and acquire X. In the conflict stage,
group B choose a fighting or passive stance. This decision is also a simulta-
neous Nash game played by the low and high cost B. If a subgroup adopts a
fighting stance, they incur the cost of conflict ci, i = 1, 2. If they are passive
they face no cost. However if both subgroups fight group B wins the conflict
with probability p. If only one subgroup fights, group B wins the conflict
with probability q, where p > q. If no subgroup of B fights then group A
win with probability 1. It is important to note that if group B wins the
conflict, X is evenly distributed amongst all of group B irrespective of who
participated. X is presumed to be a public good. As long as at least one
subgroup of B chooses to fight, the entire A is forced into conflict. However,
being the dominant group, A is assumed to have some apparatus of the
State at their disposal. Therefore individual agents in A face the cost βci,
i = 1, 2 where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
The following diagrams illustrate the game form where HC means high
cost and LC means low cost.
19
 A 
LC 
B 
HC 
B  
HC 
B 
Accept Reject 
Accept Reject Reject Accept 
Offer α 
CONFLICT CONFLICT CONFLICT 
Response Stage 
Offer Stage 
 
GAME ENDS  
 
LC 
B 
HC 
B 
HC 
B 
Fight Passive 
Fight Passive Passive Fight 
Conflict Stage 
 
GAME ENDS  GAME ENDS  GAME ENDS  GAME ENDS  
Figure 1: Heterogeneous Game Form
By backward induction, one must first consider the conflict subgame.
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As aforementioned, this is a simultaneous Nash game between the high
and low cost B, with the following payoffs.
Fight Passive
Fight pX − c1, pX − c2 qX − c1, qX
Passive qX, qX − c2 0, 0
Table 1: Conflict Subgame
The conditions under which each outcome will be an equilibrium are as
follows, where F denotes Fight and P denotes Passive.
FF FP PF PP
X > c1p−q
c2
p−q ≥ X > c1q c1p−q ≥ X > c2q X ≤ c2q , X ≤ c2p−q
Table 2: Conflict Subgame Equilibrium Conditions
The particular equilibrium outcome and whether there exist multiple
equilibria will depend on the relationship between the parameters, X, c1,
c2, p, q and r.
The assumption is made that there must be some positive payoff from
conflict with all of group B participating.
pX − c1 > 0 (1)
Furthermore, to simplify the analysis and avoid multiple equilibria, it is
assumed that
c1
q
>
c1
p− q >
c1
p
>
c2
q
>
c2
p− q (2)
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The generality of the result is not affected by the assumption in (2)2.
Given the assumption of (1) and (2), there are only 2 possible conflict sub-
game equilibria FF and PF.
Having determined the equilibrium conditions for the conflict subgame,
consider the response subgame. This also is a simultaneous Nash game be-
tween the high and low cost B, with the following payoffs.
Accept Reject
Accept αX , αX Conflict Subgame Equilibrium
Reject Conflict Subgame Equilibrium Conflict Subgame Equilibrium
Table 3: Response Subgame
The decision for both groups of B is simple.
It is a weakly dominant strategy to accept the offer if,
αX ≥ Conflict Subgame Equilibrium Payoff
Proposition 3.1. Peace is always the outcome of this game. There is an
efficient allocation that is acceptable to all parties.
Proof. First determine the minimum offer, α∗ that will be sufficient to induce
peace for each possible conflict subgame equilibrium. The heterogeneity of
B becomes highly relevant for this. To induce peace both the high and low
cost B must be willing to accept α∗. Hence the choice of α∗ must deliver
a payoff equal to the highest payoff from the conflict subgame equilibrium.
This is a consequence of A being unable to make separate offers to the low
and high cost B.
2This assumption implies that p > 2q and c1 > 2c2
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The following table shows the minimum peace-inducing offer, α∗, for
each possible conflict subgame equilibrium.
FF PF
α∗2 p− c2X q
Table 4: Minimum Peace-Inducing Offers
Hence at the offer stage, A can either make the offer α∗ that induces
peace or a lesser offer for which the game goes to conflict. The following
table shows the payoffs to group A under both peace and conflict for both
conflict subgame equilibria.
FF PF
Peace (1− α∗)Xr (1− α∗)Xr
Conflict (1− p)Xr − βci (1− q)Xr − βci
Table 5: Group A Payoffs
Substituting the appropriate α∗ for each case of the conflict subgame
equilibrium reveals that the payoff to A from peace is greater than the
payoff from conflict. Hence peace is always the outcome.
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3.1 The Unilateral Concession
A variation is now introduced into the model. A is now able to make an
ex-ante transfer to B before the game starts. The transfer is called a uni-
lateral concession and is a share γ of X where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. This concession is
distinct from and in addition to the standard “take it or leave it” offer that
A makes in the basic model. The unilateral concession is an actual transfer,
a “free” gift, not an offer to be accepted or rejected. Furthermore, since it
is ex-ante, it occurs outside any bargaining process. The transfer is made
and the remaining resource is what is up for bargaining. Importantly, the
transfer is irrevocable. Even if A and B engage in conflict, the unilateral
concession cannot be recovered by A.
Is irrevocability a plausible assumption? If X is a physical resource, then
an ex-ante transfer is easily committed to. And given that A in this model
is reactionary i.e. it is B that initiates conflict, it is possible that A’s inten-
tion in conflict is to defend the status quo instead of recovering a previously
made concession. Where X involves rights of some kind, then constitutional
measures may be required for an ex-ante transfer to be justified.
The option of offering a unilateral concession ex-ante slightly changes
the definition of the offer α. Since the unilateral concession is irrevocable,
the game becomes identical to the original game earlier, except the resources
being fought over is (1 − γ)X. Let X̂ be (1 − γ)X. With a unilateral con-
cession, the standard offer α is now defined as a share of X̂.
Given that B holds the unilateral concession irrespective of the bar-
gaining outcome, when considering B’s payoffs, one need only consider its
holding of X̂ for simplicity.
The intuition behind the unilateral concession is this. The imperfection
in the bargaining structure is such that group A has to make the same offer
to both subgroups of B. So in order to avert conflict it has to make an offer
to all of B equivalent to the highest payoff to a subgroup of B from the
conflict subgame. The unilateral concession then is a mechanism that group
A can use to affect the outcome of the conflict subgame. The unilateral
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concession may change the incentive of agents with a high cost of conflict.
I.e. it may no longer be individually rational to fight. Hence the offer that
A has to make to ensure peace is the payoff that the low cost B get from
fighting by themselves. Making a lower offer to all of B plus the unilateral
concession may possibly be a lesser transfer than making a higher offer to
all of B.
The following diagrams illustrates the game form.
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Figure 2: Heterogeneous Game Form with Unilateral Concession
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By backward induction, one must first consider the conflict subgame.
This is a simultaneous Nash game between the high and low cost B, with
the following payoffs.
Fight Passive
Fight pX̂ − c1, pX̂ − c2 qX̂ − c1, qX̂
Passive qX̂, qX̂ − c2 0, 0
Table 6: Conflict Subgame
The conditions under which each outcome will be an equilibrium are as
follows.
FF FP PF PP
X̂ > c1p−q
c2
p−q ≥ X̂ > c1q c1p−q ≥ X̂ > c2q X̂ ≤ c2q , X̂ ≤ c2p−q
Table 7: Conflict Subgame Equilibrium Conditions
From (1) and (2), the only possible conflict subgame equilibria are FF,
PF and PP with no multiple equilibria3. With a unilateral concession, A
has a mechanism for determining which of the above equilibria occur. One
can determine the optimal unilateral concession, γ∗ that induces each of the
conflict subgame equilibria. If A is seeking to induce a particular subgame,
it is always optimal to offer the minimum unilateral concession that induces
that subgame.
The following table gives the optimal unilateral concession, γ∗ that in-
duces each of the possible conflict subgame equilibria.
3There is no loss of generality by this assumption. The most interesting subgame
equilibrium is when the high cost fight but not the low cost. When that equilibrium
occurs, it always exists as a multiple equilibrium with the low cost fighting and the high
cost passive. In those circumstances neither of those equilibria end up in the SPE, because
it is optimal for A to induce FF
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FF PF PP
γ∗ 0 1− c1(p−q)X 1− c2(p−q)X
Table 8: Optimal Unilateral Concessions
Having determined the equilibrium conditions for the conflict subgame,
consider the response subgame. This also is a simultaneous Nash game be-
tween the high and low cost B, with the following payoffs.
Accept Reject
Accept αX̂ , αX̂ Conflict Subgame Equilibrium
Reject Conflict Subgame Equilibrium Conflict Subgame Equilibrium
Table 9: Response Subgame
The decision for both groups of B is simple. It is a weakly dominant
strategy to accept the offer if,
αX̂ ≥ Conflict Subgame Equilibrium Payoff
Proposition 3.2. Peace is always the outcome of the heterogeneous game
where unilateral concessions are allowed. There is an efficient allocation
that is acceptable to all parties.
Proof. One can determine the minimum offer, α∗ that will be sufficient to
induce peace for each possible conflict subgame equilibrium. Again, both
the high and low cost B must be willing to accept the offer. Hence α∗ must
deliver a payoff equal to the highest payoff from the conflict subgame equi-
librium.
The following table shows the minimum peace-inducing offer, α∗, for
each possible conflict subgame equilibrium.
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FF PF PP
α∗ p− c2
X̂
q 0
Table 10: Minimum Peace-Inducing Offer
A can either make the offer α∗ that induces peace or for any lesser offer,
the game goes to conflict. The following table shows the payoffs under both
peace and conflict.
FF PF PP
Peace (1− α) X̂r (1− α) X̂r (1− α) X̂r
Conflict (1− p) X̂r − βci (1− q) X̂r − βci X̂ r
Table 11: Group A Payoffs
Substituting the appropriate α∗ for each case of conflict subgame equi-
librium reveals that the payoff to A from peace is greater than or equal to
the payoff from conflict. Hence α∗ will always be offered by A. Therefore
peace is always the outcome.
Proposition 3.3. A sufficient condition exists for making a unilateral con-
cession to be the unique SPE of the heterogeneous game.
Proof. It is sufficient to consider the payoff to A that arises from the 3 cases
of conflict subgame equilibria. In all cases, peace is the outcome so the
payoff is of the form (1 − α∗)(1 − γ∗)Xr . One can divide all the payoffs by
X
r . Then substituting for α
∗ and γ, allows one to measure the return from
each SPE candidate .
FF
1− p+ c2
X
(3)
PF
c1(1− q)
(p− q)X (4)
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PP
c2
(p− q)X (5)
The payoff from PP, which is to make a wholly unilateral concession is
strictly dominated by the payoff from PF which is a part unilateral conces-
sion, part standard offer.4 Hence the only possible equilibrium outcomes are
PF or FF which is a wholly standard offer. Setting (4) > (3) provides the
sufficient condition under which PF delivers a higher payoff to A than FF
which is
c1(1− q)
p− q > (1− p)X + c2 (6)
If this condition holds, the unique SPE will be A making a unilateral
concession to ensure the high cost B does not fight, and a standard offer
such that the low cost B do not fight. The intuition behind this result is
that making a high offer to all of B is more expensive than the unilateral
concession plus a lower offer to all of B. This result flows from the bargaining
framework where A has to make the same offer to both subgroups of B.
Keeping in mind that this example assumes (1) and (2), an example where
PF is the outcome is p = 0.8, q = 0.35, r = 0.55, c1 = 20, c2 = 8 and
X = 50. To show where the condition does not hold and A offers a wholly
standard offer, consider the above example except with X = 120.
Observation 1. The unilateral concession is not used in a homogeneous
model
In a homogeneous model, all agents have identical costs of conflict. So
there is no longer the imperfection that group A has to offer group B some-
thing other than its payoff from the conflict subgame. This is different from
the heterogeneous case where the high cost B gets an offer equivalent to
the low cost B payoff from conflict. The absence of any cost discrepancy
would mean that in the homoegeneous case, efficiency would always be the
outcome. A would always make a transfer equivalent to B’s expected gain
4This is revealed by considering the assumption in (1) and (2 which reveal that p > 2q
and c1 > 2c2). It is also intuitive. Offering a wholly unilateral concession involves a larger
transfer than the standard offer.
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from conflict. Moreover it is intuitive that in that setting, a standard offer
would be used and not a unilateral concession. A unilateral concession in-
volves more of a transfer than a standard offer in order to achieve the same
incentive. It is only used in a heterogeneous context because A cannot offer
separate standard offers to B. Moreover, as shown, it is never optimal to
make a completely unilateral concession. The unilateral concession is effec-
tive because it is designed not to eradicate the incentive to fight completely,
but reduce the incentive of the high cost from fighting. The unilateral con-
cession effectively sets the marginal benefit of the high cost B joining the
conflict to zero. Then the required offer to ensure peace is the return from
one subgroup of B fighting, which would be lower than if both fought. So
in a homogeneous setting, and with the basic assumption in (1) that there
is a postive payoff to conflict, it would be intuitive that the standard offer
is always used to achieve peace. Using a unilateral concession would give B
a larger transfer.
3.1.1 Comparative Statics
It would be interesting to see how movements in parameters affected the
likelihood of the unilateral concession being used. Comparative Statics are
somewhat difficult to do in this model. Parameter relationships determine
the relative attractiveness of SPE payoffs. But those parameter relation-
ships also determine the possible conflict subgame equilibria and the conflict
subgame equilibria determine the possible SPE. Hence moving a parameter
may increase the likelihood of a particular SPE. However moving a parame-
ter far enough may change the conflict subgame which then changes the set
of attainable SPE. For analytical convenience, this model has assumed the
parameter relationships as in (1) and (2). However this puts a limitation
on“ceteris paribus” as some parameters are bounded. Moving one param-
eter, holding all else constant is by definition prevented. Nonetheless some
comparative statics can be obtained.
Observation 2. As X increases, the unilateral concession is less likely to
be used.
As X increases, the larger the unilateral concession becomes that is re-
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quired to stop the high cost B fighting as the return to conflict increases.
As X increases, the size of the standard offer increases as well, but the in-
cremental increase in the required unilateral concession exceeds that of the
standard offer.
Observation 3. As c1 increases, the unilateral concession is more likely to
be used.
As c1 increases, the higher the cost of conflict to the high cost B. Hence,
the incentive for them to accept a unilateral concession is greater i.e. the
unilateral concession becomes cheaper.
Observation 4. As c2 increases, the unilateral concession is less likely to
be used.
This is a limited static because c2 is bounded under c12 . But to the extent
that that relationship is maintained, an increase in c2 means the unilateral
concession is less likely to be used. This makes sense, in that as c2 increases
with c1 constant, the standard offer becomes less expensive.
Observation 5. The likelihood of using the unilateral concession is U
shaped in p
This makes sense in this way. Where p is low, the cost of offering a
unilateral concession is cheaper, as the high cost have a smaller gain from
participating in conflict. Where p is high, there is an incentive to offer the
unilateral concession. That is because the standard offer that would have
to be made if a unilateral concession was not offered, would be very high
as the payoff from both subgroups of B fighting is very high. No doubt,
the required unilateral concession also increases but it is outweighed by the
incremental increase in the standard offer.
Observation 6. As q increases, the unilateral concession is less likely to be
used.
Again q is bounded under p2 . But holding p constant and maintaining
that relationship, an increase in q increases the standard offer that A needs
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to give in addition to the unilateral concession. It may then be more prof-
itable to just give a wholly standard offer.
It is also interesting to note that the results are independent of β and
r, which is a measure of state power and the size of A respectively. This is
reflective of a simplicity in the modelling. Typically those parameters would
have an effect on p and q but that is not modelled here. m also has no bearing
on the result, because irrespective of who fights for B, the resource is shared.
mmight be expected to have some bearing on the relative probability of each
subgroup of B winning in conflict. i.e. it may not be the case that both the
low and high cost subgroup of B have the same probability of victory q.
3.2 The Modified Case: No Free Riding
The previous section assumed that because X was a public good, even if
only one subgroup of B fights, the winnings are shared with all of B. How-
ever that may not always be the case. The group that fights may be able to
exclude the others from the resource. There may be differences in wealth or
strength between the subgroups that gives the fighting subgroup the power
to expropriate the resource. Alternatively the ability to expropriate the re-
source can be explained in terms of the nature of X. If X is some budget for
ethnic public goods, e.g. temples and cultural institutions, then expropria-
tion may not be possible. But if X is a physical resource like land etc. then
even though it is notionally public, the subgroup that fights and acquires
the resource will find it to easier to exclude others. In this section, it is
assumed that if one subgroup of B fights, it retains the resource for itself
without sharing with the passive B. There is no free riding.
In this scenario, inefficiency exists as a possibility. Why? With expro-
priation, the expected loss from conflict to A may be less than the expected
gain of B. Consider the situation where only one subgroup of B fights.
The expected payoff from conflict to that subgroup will be high since it
can exclude the other members of B. But in the bargaining framework, to
appease the fighting B, group A has to offer that high expected payoff to
all the members of B. But that level of transfer may exceed A’s expected
loss from conflict. Then no transfer is able to stop conflict. However, this
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is only the case where the subgame occurs that a single subgroup fights. A
by offering a unilateral concession, determines which subgame occurs. So
in that sense, it is not a situation of A being backed into a corner where
conflict is the only option. A can choose the SPE path, so if conflict occurs,
A must want it to occur. Thus the incentive to conflict is this. Making a
unilateral concession increases the profitability of conflict to A because by
reducing the incentives of others to fight, A now has a higher probability of
victory.
The game form is identical to the earlier heterogeneous case except the
payoffs in the conflict subgame are now different. The case where both sub-
groups of B fight is the same as before. They win with probability p and
share X equally. However if only one subgroup fights, they win with prob-
ability q as before, but that subgroup retains the entire X. Again, if no
subgroup of B fights, A retains X with probability 1.
First consider the case with no unilateral concession.
The new conflict subgame is as follows.
Fight Passive
Fight pX − c1, pX − c2 qXm − c1, 0
Passive 0, q X(1−m) − c2 0, 0
Table 12: Conflict Subgame
Given the assumption of (1), the unique equilibrium of the conflict sub-
game is PP. Then the overall result is the same as the model with free riding.
The outcome is peace, with A offering an acceptable concession α∗ = p− c2X .
Now consider the situation where A can offer a unilateral concession, γ.
Again, α now refers to a share of X̂.
The conflict subgame is as follows.
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Fight Passive
Fight pX̂ − c1, pX̂ − c2 q X̂m − c1, 0
Passive 0, q X̂(1−m) − c2 0, 0
Table 13: Conflict Subgame
The equilibrium conditions are given by.
FF FP PF PP
X̂ > c1p
c2
p ≥ X̂ > c1mq c1p ≥ X̂ > c2(1−m)q X̂ ≤ c2(1−m)q , X̂ ≤ c1mq
Table 14: Conflict Subgame Equilibrium Conditions
Depending on the relationship between the parameters, many equilibria
are possible, some of them multiple. The assumption in (1) that there is a
positive profit to conflict with both subgroups of B fighting is maintained.
In order to simplify the analysis (2) is relaxed and replaced with a new
assumption, which is
c1
p
>
c1m
q
>
c2(1−m)
q
>
c2
p
(7)
From the assumption in (7) the only possible conflict subgame equilibria
are FF, PF and PP, none of them multiple. Implicit in (7) is that m < 12 . So
there are more low cost B than high cost B. With a unilateral concession,
A has a mechanism for determining which of the above equilibria occur.
As noted in 3.1 the optimal unilateral concession that induces each of the
conflict subgame equilibria is the minimum one. The following table gives
the optimal unilateral concession that induces each of the possible conflict
subgame equilibria.
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FF PF PP
γ∗ 0 1− c1pX 1− c2(1−m)qX
Table 15: Optimal Unilateral Concessions
Having determined the equilibrium conditions for the conflict subgame,
consider the response subgame. This takes the same form as before with the
following payoffs.
Accept Reject
Accept αX̂ , αX̂ Conflict Subgame Equilibrium
Reject Conflict Subgame Equilibrium Conflict Subgame Equilibrium
Table 16: Response Subgame
The decision for both groups of B is simple. It is a weakly dominant
strategy to accept the offer if,
αX̂ ≥ Conflict Subgame Equilibrium Payoff
Proposition 3.4. A sufficient condition exists under which partial conflict
is the unique SPE of the modified game with unilateral concessions.
Proof. One can determine the minimum offer, α∗ that will be accepted for
each possible conflict subgame equilibrium. Again, both the high and low
cost B must be willing to accept the offer. Hence α∗ must deliver a payoff
equal to the highest payoff from the conflict subgame equilibrium. The
following table shows the minimum peace-inducing offer α∗, for each possible
conflict subgame equilibrium.
FF PF PP
α∗ p− c2
X̂
q
1−m − c2X̂ 0
Table 17: Minimum Peace-Inducing Offer
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The game then goes to the offer stage. A can either make the offer α∗
that induces peace or for any lesser offer, the game goes to conflict. The
following table shows the payoff to A under both peace and conflict.
FF PF PP
Peace Payoff (1− α∗) X̂r (1− α∗) X̂r (1− α∗) X̂r
Conflict Payoff (1− p) X̂r − βci (1− q) X̂r − βci X̂r
Table 18: Group A Payoffs
For conflict subgame equilibria FF and PP, peace prevails since offer-
ing the applicable α∗ delivers a payoff greater than or equal to conflict.
Those SPE candidates can be called AFF and APP, with A denoting ac-
cept. However for the conflict subgame equilibrium PF the outcome is not
clear. There are circumstances under which the expected return from con-
flict offers a higher payoff to A than peace. Then A will not offer α∗. Let
this SPE candidate be called RPF, where R denotes reject. However there
are circumstances where peace is preferred and α∗ is offered. Let this SPE
candidate be called APF. Substituting in for α∗ and γ, the condition for
which RPF is preferred to APF is
qc1 >
p(1−m)
m
(c2 + rβci) (8)
However, in order for partial conflict to be the SPE of the game, it is not
sufficient that RPF be prefered to APF. RPF must be preferred to APF,
AFF and APP. Substituting in for α∗ and γ, the payoff to A from all of
those equilibria are as follows.
RPF
c1(1− q)
pr
− βci
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APF
c1
pr
(1− q
1−m) +
c2
r
AFF
(1− p)X
r
+
c2
r
APP
c2(1−m)
qr
From the assumption in (7), APP is always strictly dominated by APF.
Again intuitively, it is never optimal for group A to offer a wholly unilateral
concession as it will have to transfer more than necessary. Hence there are
two conditions for conflict to occur. That is that the payoff from RPF is
greater than the payoff from APF and that the payoff from RPF is greater
than AFF. The first condition has been shown in (8). The second condition
can be expressed as follows.
c1q < c1 − pβcir − p(1− p)X − pc2 (9)
Combining (8) and (9), gives the single sufficient condition under which
conflict will occur.
c1
p
− βcir − (1− p)X − c2 > 1−m
m
(βcir + c2) (10)
So under the above condition (10), conflict will be the unique SPE of
the game. A simple example can be given as well, remembering that the
example must also satisfy the assumption in (1) and in (7). Therefore, an ex-
ample where conflict is the equilibrium is X = 17, c1 = 35, c2 = 5, p = 0.85,
q = 0.6, r = 0.6, m = 0.25, β = 0. For an example where peace prevails,
take the same example but with X = 200.
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The intuition can be seen in two ways. With expropriation, the ex-
pected gain to group B from A having to make a large offer is greater than
the expected loss of A from conflict. So once on that SPE path, peace is
not possible. However this SPE path is chosen by A. Other choices of the
unilateral concession would have ended with peace. So this result is not just
that A has no way of achieving peace due to a problem with the valuation
of conflict. A prefers conflict and deliberately induces that path. So in that
sense, the intuition is that A can find it optimal to use a unilateral concession
to buy off the high cost B in order to create a situation of profitable conflict.
As aforementioned, the bargaining imperfection that incentivises the use
of the unilateral concession is that A is not able to make separate offers to
the high and low cost B. However in the first model, the fact that the
agents share the resource avoids inefficiency. I.e. even though A has to
make the high cost B an offer equivalent to the conflict payoff of the low
cost B, the aggregate payment can never be greater than the expected loss
from conflict by A. Hence peace always occurs. The unilateral concession at
best can improve the payoff to the A. With expropriation, that guarantee
is no longer there. The bargaining imperfection leads to a situation where
the expected loss from conflict is less than the conflict averting transfer.
But in this case, whilst the bargaining imperfection is the foundation for
the efficiency, the unilateral concession is pivotal. I.e. if the unilateral
concession was not available to A, then peace would have occurred. So whilst
bargaining imperfections drive inefficiency, the ability to make a unilateral
concession is shown to be pivotal in the loss of overall welfare. This is quite
counter-intuitive. An additional instrument of transfer would appear to be
welfare enhancing.
3.2.1 Comparative Statics
It would be interesting to see how movements in parameters affected the
likelihood of conflict occurring. As in the earlier model, comparative statics
become problematic as the earlier assumptions put bounds on some param-
eters. Nonetheless some insights can be gained.
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Observation 7. Conflict is more likely where the group A decision-makers
maximise the payoff for their low cost members.
Conflict is more likely because the cost to them is less. This may seem
somewhat trivial, but must be noted. This takes on significance depend-
ing on the assumptions of the electoral system and if particular groups are
pivotal to a government holding power. This model has not made those
assumptions. However the model points to the likelihood of conflict being
highly affected by the interaction of demography and political systems.
Observation 8. Conflict is more likely where β is smaller.
β is the other component of the cost of conflict to A in addition to ci,
i = 1, 2. So again it may seem somewhat trivial that the lower β is, the more
likely conflict is, because the cost of it is lower. As defined in the model, A
only faces the cost βci, i = 1, 2 because the apparatus of State is used to
wage conflict. This suggests that the more powerful and efficient the state
is, the lower β becomes and hence the higher likelihood of conflict. If β is
some coefficient of state power, then it is plausible for it to also affect the
probabilities p and q of victory by B in conflict.
Observation 9. Peace is more likely where r is larger.
This makes sense. The larger A is, the little it has to gain from conflict.
The resource must be divided up amongst more people, of which any benefit
is highly likely to be outweighed by the cost. A was assumed at the start
to be the dominant group. However no assumption was made as to whether
it was the majority, only that it had more power. Hence r may have some
bearing on the probabilities p and q as well as c1 and c2.
Observation 10. Conflict is more likely where m is larger.
As m becomes larger the proportion of B who have a low cost of conflict
is smaller. Thus the individual payoff to the low cost B from fighting by
themselves becomes higher. But the payoff required to avert conflict be-
comes higher. This can lead to the situation where the expected loss from
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conflict is less than the expected gain of the other party. Hence partial con-
flict would be more likely than peace.
Observation 11. Peace is more likely where X is larger.
As X increases, the expected payoff from conflict becomes larger. How-
ever, the cost of the unilateral concession to induce conflict becomes larger
as there is a higher marginal gain to the high cost B from joining in conflict.
The increase in the required unilateral concession dominates the increase in
the expected payoff to conflict.
Comparative statics with c1, c2, p q is much harder because those pa-
rameters are bounded by the assumption in (7). Only small shifts can occur
in some parameters before other parameters need to shift in order to pre-
serve (7). However some points can be noted.
Observation 12. As c1 increases, conflict becomes more likely.
As c1 increases, the incentive for the high cost B to fight declines. Hence
it becomes profitable for A to “buy off” the high cost B by offering a uni-
lateral concession. The expected payoff from conflict less a small unilateral
concession may be higher than making a high transfer to obtain peace.
Observation 13. As c2 increases, conflict becomes less likely.
Again assuming c2 moves within its bound such that other parameters
are unchanged, an increase in c2 reduces the likelihood of conflict. That is
because the cost of the offer that appeases the low cost B becomes cheaper.
Observation 14. The likelihood of conflict is U shaped in p
This makes sense in this way. Where p is low, the cost of offering a
unilateral concession is cheaper, as the high cost have a smaller gain from
participating in conflict. So the expected payoff from conflict less a small
unilateral concession is likely to be high. Where p is high, there is an in-
centive to offer the unilateral concession. The required unilateral concession
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will be higher but that will be less than the expected offer that is induced
without the unilateral concession as the payoff from both subgroups of B
fighting is high. So the expected return to conflict less a larger unilateral
concession will be preferred to making an even larger offer to B.
Observation 15. The likelihood of conflict is independent of q
This is counter-intuitive. 1− q is the probability of A winning the con-
flict. How then can it be independent? When combining the two conditions
for conflict, q was influenced by all the above parameters. So in that sense,
q is affected by movements in other parameters. Particularly, the assump-
tions that define the conflict subgame equilibria, bound q. So as the other
parameters move, q necessarily moves.
4 Discussion
The above results show the unilateral concession in one class of games as
a mechanism of improving the efficient outcome to A and in another class
of game as inducing an inefficient outcome. What is driving this result?
As in the case of the “selective acceptance” rule in Weinberger (2002), the
unilateral concession in this thesis does not deliver interesting results in its
own right. It plays a unique role in certain conditions, that being with
heterogeneous agents. The bargaining imperfection that generates both the
above results is this. A is unable to negotiate with the high and low cost B
separately. If that were so, efficiency would always occur. Unilateral con-
cession or no unilateral concession, A could make a standard offer to each
subgroup of B equivalent to their expected gain from conflict. Examined
this way, it becomes apparent why inefficiency may arise in this model with
respect to Coase (1960). The fact that A has to offer the same contract to
both subgroups of B despite the fact that one subgroup achieves a lesser
value payoff in conflict, is effectively a cost on bargaining. Hence Coase’s
assumption of costless bargaining is breached.
But is this bargaining structure plausible. Surely A can distinguish be-
tween the two groups ofB and make separate transfers. The most convincing
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argument is that whilst the low cost B may be visible when they fight, A has
no way of knowing that in advance and is therefore not able to give them
an independent concession. Moreover, any attempts to do so would give all
of B an incentive to pass themselves off as members of the low cost group.
Another reason is that given that X is a public good, A is not able to ap-
portion it to constituent groups of B. Then the issue is not so much whether
A can identify the subgroups of B. Even if A can identify the low cost B,
A may not be able to enforce a particular division of resources. Particularly
if A disappears once the transfer is made e.g. A is some colonial power. In
the final model where exclusion was allowed, one justification was that the
low cost B had some superior strength that allowed it to expropriate X. So
A may not be able to enforce a division between the subgroups of B.
It is possible in a political context that there are limitations on who gov-
ernments can deal with. e.g. a group may exist as a coalition but it is not
possible to deal with them. One reason may be a principle-based argument,
with an extreme case being terrorist groups. A may in principle refuse to
deal with extremists. Another reason may be practicality. The low cost B
may exist as a coalition but if it is a non-political actor, it may not be able
to credibly accept concessions.
As such it is a credible situation where A is only able to deal with B
as a monolithic bloc, despite the presence of two types of agents. Horowitz
(1989) points out how the existence of race-based parties in Sri Lanka un-
like Malaysia led to a more stable domestic situation in the latter, despite
Malaysia ex-ante having more ingredients for racial conflict than Sri Lanka.
That makes sense, in that if the options for political systems are race-based
or class-based, a class-based political coalition has ethnic heterogeneity but
that it is not material in terms of the economic payoff agents require. Eco-
nomic homogeneity lends itself to more efficient outcomes.
In games where B have heterogeneous costs but the resource they fight
over is purely public in nature, efficiency is always the outcome i.e. peace.
But the unilateral concession is an optimal choice under certain conditions.
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So the bargaining imperfection creates an opportunity for the unilateral
concession to be profitable for A, but not inefficient. Because any acquired
resource must be shared, the expected gain of B is always less than or equal
to the expected loss from conflict to A. Hence there will always be an effi-
cient i.e. peaceful settlement. However the unilateral concession can become
a cheaper way of achieving peace for A. The unilateral concession is used to
change the equilibrium in the conflict subgame. Effectively, the unilateral
concession is made to buy off the high cost B i.e. make conflict unprofitable
for them. So if fighting occurs, it would only be the low cost B i.e. partial
conflict. Hence the offer that is made to B in the bargaining game need only
be equivalent to the payoff from conflict with only the low cost B fighting.
So circumstances arise where making a unilateral concession and then mak-
ing all of B a lower offer is cheaper than a zero unilateral concession and
making all of B a more expensive offer. Efficiency is always the outcome
but the use of a unilateral concession can sometimes be the optimal efficient
allocation for A. It is a tool that skews the bargaining process in A’s favour.
The most interesting result occurs where B have heterogeneous costs
but the non-participating B will be excluded. This immediately raises the
individual payoff to the B that do fight. It then becomes apparent why
inefficiency may occur. If the conflict subgame is such that only one group
of B fight, their expected payoff becomes very high. So in order to ensure
peace, a high contract must be given to all the B. However the level of
resource that such a contract takes up may leave A worse off than with
conflict. The expected gain to B from partial conflict exceeds the expected
loss of A. Hence conflict occurs. But remember that the choice of unilat-
eral concession defines the conflict subgame . The unilateral concession is
a choice variable. So if the unilateral concession is chosen such that only
one group of B finds it profitable to fight, the outcome can be conflict. But
should such a unilateral concession be chosen? A can make a zero unilateral
concession such that both parties fight. Then it would be optimal to make
an offer equivalent to the expected return of conflict to the low cost B to all
of B. This thesis argues that it is optimal for A to make the unilateral con-
cession that buys off the high cost B, knowing that the outcome is partial
conflict. The expected gain from conflict, (now with a higher probability of
victory because only one subgroup of B fights) less the unilateral concession
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is greater than the certain peace that comes from a zero unilateral conces-
sion and making a high standard offer. So the inefficient outcome has a
multiplicity of causes. It arises due to a misalignment between the expected
loss of one party from conflict compared to the expected gain of the other.
This misalignment occurs due to the ability of one subgroup to exclude non
participating members which increases the payoff to conflict. Moreover due
to a bargaining structure where all members have to be given the same of-
fer, the transfer required to avert conflict is very high. But crucially, this
misalignment is deliberately brought on by A. Without the unilateral con-
cession, it would never occur. So the model is not an intractable situation
of either war or a crippling peace. It is a choice to induce a profitable con-
flict. A in some sense, wants conflict. The unilateral concession improves
the profitability of conflict to A by reducing the incentives of others to fight.
So in that sense, three factors are pivotal for inefficiency in this model.
Without heterogeneous costs and the inability to bargain with the low and
high cost B separately, there would be no inefficiency. Secondly, without the
ability of subgroups to exclude non-participating members, inefficiency can
never occur. Thirdly, without the unilateral concession being available as an
instrument, no inefficiency would occur. In the final model with exclusion
allowed, where A could not make a unilateral concession, peace was still the
outcome. It was the introduction of the capacity to make unilateral conces-
sions on top of the above described features that induced an inefficient SPE.
This provides the remarkable and counter-intuitive result, that a mech-
anism of making transfers actually engenders conflict as an SPE. This is
similar to Weinberger (2000) where selective acceptance was thought to be
prima-facie efficiency enhancing. Intuitively a mechanism of making trans-
fers would be thought to enhance peace. In a sense, in the first model, the
unilateral concession makes peace more profitable to A, but in B it allows
for a profitable conflict. The common effect of the unilateral concession in
both cases is to increase the payoff to A.
44
4.1 Policy Implications
Ethnic conflict is such an intractable phenomenon that virtually most of the
discussion has some policy implications.
Firstly the basic result shows how a policy of “divide and rule” effectively
setting one subgroup against another can work. This is the result from the
first model. The dominant group finds conflict unprofitable and wishes to
avoid conflict. The way it does so is by making conflict unprofitable to one
group of the population. Then with a low capacity to fight, fairly small con-
cessions keep rebellion at bay. This in fact is the way most colonial powers
operated. In both the Roman and British empires, the conquered popula-
tions consisted of an elite class that enjoyed the benefits of the empire and
stood to lose from conflict.
More importantly is what the model suggests about the use of conces-
sions to do this. Because of the bargaining imperfections between the par-
ties, unilateral concessions are used to buy off one subgroup to create that
reduced incentive for conflict. Abstracting from colonial situations and to
bargaining in general, this is a theoretical basis for why in negotiations, one
party may offer an ex-ante concession before the formal bargaining process.
This may also prompt some revisiting of the standard reason that uni-
lateral concessions are offered as a sign of goodwill between asymmetric
parties. If one allows for heterogeneity in the party being offered the con-
cession, then it is possible that the motive is in fact to split the opposing
coalition. This would have relevance to the international relations literature
which typically advocates the “signalling argument.” Consider the interac-
tion of two state actors. This typically has the feature in this model. States
deal with each other as states. E.g. the U.S does not deal with high cost
and low cost China. It can only deal with China as a whole. Yet there are
heterogeneous agents within China that have different interests. Hence the
unilateral concession would act as a way for a state to play off the different
domestic interests of a rival state against each other. Considered this way,
it then can be seen how a unilateral concession could lead to the first result
which is a profitable peace or a profitable conflict.
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Interestingly the result in this model gives a rationale why a party pur-
suing the inefficient path, where the unilateral concession is chosen in order
to induce conflict, may still make a standard offer. The thesis has argued
that when conflict occurs it is a unique SPE. In a technical sense that is
not true. When conflict is being pursued, A offers a unilateral concession
to induce the high cost B not to fight. Then there exists an offer α∗ that
would persuade the low cost B not to fight. The model has simply said that
A will then offer α < α∗. That α could be zero or α− , where  is negligi-
ble. So in that sense there are an infinite range of SPE’s corresponding to
a choice of α < α∗. All those choices of α are refused and lead to the same
outcome. However it can be understood why in political terms A would
have a preference for offering α−  compared to 0, although mathematically
in the model, they should be indifferent. Even though A knows the offer
will be refused, A can then claim to have acted in good faith. It has after
all, made a unilateral concession as well as making a standard offer. Par-
ticularly in an international relations context, making such an offer allows a
discriminatory State to claim to be working towards a political settlement
whilst deliberately pursuing conflict. So there is strategic benefit in offering
the standard concession even if conflict is the desired outcome.
The thesis has advocated reasons why features of conflict are observed in
the world, but are there any solutions? In the first model, where efficiency
is guaranteed, the unilateral concession transfers more of the surplus to the
dominant group. In the second case, it can lead to conflict. Purely on the
basis of this model, one might say that unilateral concessions then are a
welfare diminishing instrument and should be banned. This is ironic given
that much of the literature identify committment problems as a source of
conflict. I.e. in this model, the assumption was made that the unilateral
concession is irrevocable. In contexts where that assumption is problematic,
committment problems can occur. So the grain of the literature would be
that credible instruments of transfer are optimal. Particularly in a repeated
game context where transfers have to be made over time, the ability to
make credible ex-ante transfers would be seen as a positive. But the solu-
tion that emerges from this model is not necessarily to weaken constitutions
and limit the ability to make ex-ante transfers. In most cases that would not
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be possible and the suggestion somewhat absurd. The unilateral concession
is pivotal to conflict and in the earlier result it is pivotal to A obtaining
a larger share of the efficient surplus. But also pivotal is the bargaining
framework that underpins this entire model. I.e. a bargaining system where
A negotiates with B as a monolithic coalition. It is this assumption that
offers the most scope to policymakers. Excluding the case, where A is un-
able to enforce apportionment of the resource within B, the most obvious
reason why the bargaining framework presented in this model occurs, is due
to identification problems. A is unable to recognise the high and low cost B
in advance. This is broadly analogous to the situation where the political
system only consists of ethnic based parties, and a limited number of ethnic
parties, so that heterogeneous members of an ethnic group only have sin-
gular representation. Again as aforementioned, monolithic ethnic political
parties have the unique feature of economic heterogeneity unlike class based
parties. So they have this feature that the elites or well off amongst them
can be “bought off” by unilateral concessions. Indeed this is a reason why
ethnic political parties are susceptible to the accusation that they serve the
interests of the elite members of their group. This shows that the salience
of ethnic conflict comes from not just the incentives of coalition formation
as in Esteban and Ray (2008) and their synergy of operation, but in fact
from the way opponents play off rival economic interests against each other.
In a sense Esteban and Ray (2008) argue for ethnic conflict because of a
stability or synergy from ethnic coalitions. This thesis shows how conflict
emerges not as a result of the ethnic coalition working together in synergy
but because they are easily divided. So what would allow for more efficient
outcomes for policymakers in the context of this model? If operating at time
zero, it is to steer away from ethnic based political parties to avoid that het-
erogeneity. Alternatively, if ethnic parties are the norm, then increasing the
number of parties in the political process would allow for different agents to
have multiple representation. This would also allow for the divergent agents
within an ethnic bloc like B to negotiate with each other. In the present
model, the imperfection is not just that A does not negotiate with the sub-
groups of B. It is that the two groups of B only play Nash games and do
not contract with each other.
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4.2 Features of the Model
It is also important to note that the model employed in this thesis is a simple
one. As a result some parameters are treated as exogenous and indepen-
dent when in fact there is the possibility of a relationship. This has created
analytical convenience, but allowing for those relationships may affect the
results. The clearest example is the choice of probabilities p and q assigned
to victory by B when they fight together and as a subgroup respectively.
Those probabilities would be affected by the relative proportion of B to A,
the relative wealth of group B to A and the power of the state. Hence p
and q would be decreasing in r. They would also be increasing in β, which
reflects state power5. Also q would be affected by m. In fact this model as-
sumes that the low and high cost B have the same probability of victory q.
Given that the strength of A is common to both, that assumption means the
low and high cost B either have the same population (m = 12) and wealth
or that aggregating those variables gives the high and low cost a parity of
strength. Moreover, in the final model, the assumption is introduced that
a subgroup of B may have some advantage that enables them to exclude
the others. Surely that would increase its probability of unilateral victory
compared with the other subgroup unless some other factor balanced out
that advantage.
If the probabilities p and q were made endogenously reliant on wealth,
population and state power, those parameters would have a potential rela-
tionship with c1 and c2. An ambiguity in this model is the source of the
heterogeneous costs. What is the reason behind some individuals having cost
of conflict c1 and others c2? The ambiguity in this thesis was deliberate.
There are multiple reasons behind cost heterogeneity. In that sense simply
considering a society with heterogeneous costs allows for a general result
on the effects of those costs independent of the drivers. However as noted
in the previous paragraph, given that this model blocs B into coalitions on
the basis of cost, the particular drivers of the cost discrepancy are relevant
to ascertain the probability of each group’s success in partial conflict. In
this model given that p and q were fixed exogenously it was not necessary
5Remembering that β is the proportion of the cost of conflict borne by A with the
remainder incurred by the state.
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to introduce the drivers of cost heterogeneity. Generality is an advantage.
But a more refined model would not exogenously fix p and q. In that case
the drivers of cost heterogeneity would have to be considered. At one level,
a higher wealth level would suggest a lower cost of conflict. A wealthy B
can utilise technology, political and media apparatus or mercenaries to wage
conflict more effectively and at lower personal cost. However, much of that
is how wealth improves the probability of victory as opposed to minimise the
cost. In fact, it is the wealthy’s capacity to expend cost, that improves the
probability of victory. Moreover even if the cost from conflict to a wealthy
individual’s person is less, that is likely to arise from expending other costs
e.g. financial to minimise the cost to the person. This analysis points to
the fact that a high wealth level may in fact increase the cost of conflict.
This would be modelled as such. Individuals in conflict allocate some fixed
proportion λ of their stock of wealth to fighting. So the cost of conflict
becomes λy where y is the measure of wealth. Hence higher wealth causes
a higher cost of conflict. Another way of thinking about it is that wealthier
individuals have more to lose from a conflict, where as the poorer do not. A
scenario where wealthy individuals may have a lower cost of conflict would
be if some resources e.g. media and political machinery can be used without
cost, but are accessible only to the wealthy but not the poor, maybe for
reasons like education levels. It is important to note that including a stock
of wealth in the payoffs to agents would not have changed our result. c1
and c2 would then just become cy1 and cy2 respectively, with heterogeneous
wealth driving the cost discrepancy. What is relevant is including wealth
as an input into the probability of success in conflict. As such if there is a
relationship between the cost of conflict and wealth, that should be reflected
in the probability function for the high and low cost B.
Assuming costs are increasing in wealth, creates an interesting scenario.
The high and low cost B become the rich and poor B respectively. Then
m becomes pivotal. If m ≥ 12 then the rich B can be presumed to have a
higher probability of victory by themselves. They have both higher wealth
and more numbers. If m < 12 then whether the wealthy or poor B has a
higher probability of victory will depend on the competing effects of wealth
and manpower. The relative attractiveness of partial conflict for both sub-
groups will depend on the interaction of wealth, numerical strength and
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costs i.e. y, λ and m. This model, due to the parameter assumptions only
considered the subgame where the low cost i.e. poor B engaged in partial
conflict. However the above suggests the situation where the high cost B
engage in partial conflict is a real scenario. This is relevant when consid-
ering ethnic conflicts. Some conflicts are characterised by the agitation of
the wealthy, educated class of the oppressed group with the poorer members
seemingly disengaged. However others are largely led by poorer members
with the wealthy members conspicuously absent.
Considering A, if r was included as a factor affecting the probabilities
p and q, then as r increased, the payoff to conflict to A would diminish
but their probability of victory would increase i.e. p and q would become
smaller. This would challenge the static result in this model.
Another point of note, though somewhat incidental is that the model
only considers private costs of conflict and not social costs. Most models
of conflict would have X reduced by a fraction as a result of conflict. e.g.
degradation of natural resources or a depletion of the budget because the
State is engaged in conflict, as in this model. Excluding social costs of
conflict was simply done for analytical convenience. Including social costs
would not change the range of SPE, but it would expect to limit the range
of outcomes where conflict occurs. Social costs reduce the potential payoff
from conflict.
4.3 Repeated Games
A potential criticism of this model is that it is only a single period game.
Most conflicts typically would take place over multiple periods. Moreover, in
a repeated game, past actions can influence future equilibrium paths. So a
repeated game extension is more realistic than the assumption in this model
that conflict is mere lottery on exogenous outcomes. Solving the present
game in a repeated setting is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is possi-
ble to raise some implications of extending it into a repeated game setting.
If the present game were to be extended into further periods, what form
would it take?
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One possibility is the role of internal fighting within B. If A can be
treated as some colonial power that battles for the equity of a country in
the first period and then leaves, the subsequent periods would be interac-
tions within B. Then both the high and low cost B can be expected to fight
for their optimal share of the resource. The role of internal conflict within
B is a natural corollary of modelling heterogeneity. What is the likely result
of a repeated game? Whilst no attempt is made to solve the repeated game,
the prospect of a subsequent internal conflict would undermine the ability of
a single subgroup to expropriate the resource from the B that did not fight
against A initially. They may expropriate the resource at first, but that sur-
plus is likely to be challenged by the other subgroup in subsequent periods.
In the second model, where free-riding is not allowed, inefficiency emerges
because the offer A has to make to all the B is equivalent to the payoff
that one subgroup gets from expropriation. The required offer exceeds the
expected loss from conflict. If subsequent periods of fighting diminish that
payoff, it may reduce the required offer that A has to make and an efficient
outcome may be more likely.
A second way of thinking about the repeated game is to consider what
happens to the standard offer α. If α is accepted in one period, does it re-
main in the subsequent period? If α vanishes in the next period if conflict is
chosen, then the repeated game simply becomes the one-shot game multiple
times with the same α being offered in each period. That is perhaps not
realistic in a repeated game since at some point it has to be transferred.
From the point α is transferred, then B has an incentive for conflict in the
next period. α is already transferred so the offer in one period does not
necessarily prevent A having to make another offer in subsequent periods.
This reduces the benefit to A from making offers, so it is possible that com-
mittment problems move the game in the favour of conflict.
This model presents conflict as initiated by B in response to expropria-
tion by a dominant A. A’s rise to power is exogenous in this model and A’s
role is primarily to strategically apportion X. However in a repeated game,
one could model A asserting some strength. That may in some way counter
the incentive of B to take an offer in one period and then demand another
offer in the subsequent period. Although α is transferred at the end of one
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period, in subsequent conflicts, previously accepted offers are contested by
A. So B in a repeated game by choosing conflict, jeopardises previously
accepted offers. This might slant the game towards efficiency.
Another factor that would take on greater significance in a repeated
game is the role of social costs of conflict. For analytical convenience, this
thesis only considered agent-specific costs in conflict. This did not affect the
result but including social costs would narrow the range in which conflict
could occur. In a repeated game, if social costs are included, the pie of
resources gets smaller with every conflict. That would reduce the incentive
from conflict and might push the game towards efficiency.
4.4 Other Extensions
Another set of extensions could be worthwhile to consider. It may not be
analytically appropriate to extend all of them on to this model but they may
be worthwhile topics of independent research.
One possible extension would be to give agents some productive capacity.
This issue has been considered by the literature in Mc Dermott (1997) and
Falkinger (1999). This productivity would highly likely be correlated with
the group’s high or low cost status as opposed to random. Although it is
possible it could be a third dimension in addition to ethnicity and cost. As-
suming productivity is correlated with high or low cost status, the incentive
of B to fight would depend on their productive capacity e.g. if they would
make a profit if they won the resource. So a wealthy/high cost B may have
more incentive to fight due to higher productivity with the resource. The
relationship between productivity and wealth may not always be in that
direction. It would have a particular interplay with the characteristic of the
resource. e.g. if the resource was professional job and university admission
quotas, it may only be of interest to wealthy/educated agents. But if X is
land and agricultural resources, it may be of concern to poorer rural mem-
bers of B. In a sense productivity becomes more generally, the relevance of
the resource to B. This may explain why some ethnic conflicts only engage
a certain strata of the discriminated group. Of course if agents are fighting
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over a financial budget, then one requires a generic notion of productivity
because agents can be assumed to be neutral with respect to money.
The idea that logically follows from productivity is, can A then give the
resource to productive B and then tax them? That might be efficient and
deliver a higher payoff to A compared to restricting the B’s access to the
resource itself.
This thesis makes the reasonable assumption that some “dominance”
confers political power to A. It is not assumed whether r > 1 and it is a
majority or whether it is a dominant minority e.g. apartheid South Africa.
However whether the high or low cost interests of A are being maximised
is left unmodelled. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to model the path
of group A to power. e.g. coalition choice and any earlier conflicts. But
the way in which A sustains power would be relevant to the extent that it
imposes a constraint on its decision making. In particular if the rule of A
is sustained by an electoral democracy, theories such as the median voter
theorem and others would suggest that the distribution of high and low cost
A crucially informs what decision is taken. If B has voting rights, then their
relative population becomes significant. For simplicity, ignore B’s voting
rights and just on the cost distribution of A. Then changes in m not only
affect the profitability of conflict to B but it also affects the maximising
decision of A. This would be quite different to the comparative statics in
this model.
This also draws attention to another key assumption in the model. m is
assumed to be a uniform distribution amongst A and B. However the cost
distribution may be different. Then changes in the distribution of costs are
considered separately for each ethnic group. This may be relevant in that in
many conflicts, the warring parties have vastly different demographic pro-
files and those discrepancies inform the conflict. e.g. group identity may be
correlated with a certain type of economic profile.
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5 Conclusion
Conflict is an intractable phenomenon in the world at large. Yet standard
bargaining logic would suggest that more often than not, complete informa-
tion allows for an efficient transfer to be made. Conflict emerges in this the-
sis because a dominant party cannot make separate offers to heterogeneous
members of an ethnic coalition. The unilateral concession then provides the
dominant party with a mechanism of ex-ante influencing the profitability
of conflict of the other side. The interplay between heterogeneous agents,
an imperfect bargaining framework and the unilateral concession is shown
to lead to either conflict or a peaceful outcome that favours the dominant
party. This is a counter-intuitive result in the sense that an instrument of
transfer can be shown to be pivotal to the achievement of an inefficient out-
come.
The bargaining mechanism in this thesis is not an ad hoc construction.
Indeed ethnic-based political parties are common in many societies and those
parties straddle a range of divergent economic interests. Thus this thesis
shows why such coalitions may serve the interest of dominant powers that
exploit the internal economic fault lines within large race-based coalitions
i.e. via conflict or a skewing of the peace. So this thesis adds a policy im-
perative against monolithic ethnic coalitions. Coalitions based on economic
interests, or that reduce the extent to which a single party solely represents
divergent interests would lead to more efficient and equitable outcomes.
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